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Teaching the elements of crimes  
J.J. Child, Senior Lecturer in Law, Sussex Law School 
 
The criminal law of England and Wales, as with other jurisdictions, is made up of many 
thousands of offences. Therefore, no more than a small sample could ever be taught within a 
criminal law module. The task for the academic is to teach this small sub-set of offences so as 
to provide students with a wide and contextual understanding of criminal law in general, and 
a mechanism through which to understand and analyse other specific offences in the future. 
Both aspects are vital to any criminal law module, but it is the mechanism aspect that will be 
the focus of this chapter.  
 Our mechanisms for understanding and analysing criminal law are often referred to as 
the elements of crimes. Essentially, we aim to deconstruct whole criminal offences into their 
constituent elements. We do this in order to identify patterns between offences (often referred 
to as general principles), encourage consistent analysis between offences, provide a 
vocabulary for commenting on specific parts of offences, provide a structure for independent 
analysis of future offences, and so on. However, as discussed by Fiona Donson and Catherine 
O’Sullivan (2016) in the previous chapter, the identification and use of elements within the 
criminal law can also be problematic, potentially complicating rather than facilitating analysis 
and debate.  
This chapter explores the teaching of criminal elements over five sections. The first 
discusses current practice in teaching, textbooks, and in court judgements, highlighting 
problems of incoherence and inconsistency. The second examines the potential for a 
universal structure of element analysis, and how this can be used in teaching. The third 
highlights the potential advantages of this, with the fourth highlighting some potential 
problems. Finally, the fifth provides an overview of element analysis in other common law 
jurisdictions. The discussion makes use of law and psychology literature to explain and 
support a number of the points made. However, it should be acknowledged that much of the 
substance of the chapter has emerged more organically from experience and discussion with 
colleagues.     
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Current practice in England and Wales, current concerns 
Analysing the criminal law through elements (of one kind or another) is entirely standard 
practice. In England and Wales, this predominantly focuses on the separation of actus reus 
(external elements of an offence) and mens rea (mental elements of an offence), which can be 
usefully referred to as ‘offence analysis’ (Robinson and Grall, 1983). Discussion of offence 
analysis generally takes place in the early lectures of a criminal law module, and almost 
universally within the early chapters of textbooks. Students are thereby set up with a toolbox 
for analysis, and a structure through which to make sense of each of the specific offences 
tackled during their studies. Rather than viewing each ‘new’ offence as a unique collection of 
rules, students are encouraged to find order: to separate the offence in terms of actus reus and 
mens rea, to clarify both sets of requirements, and through this to see commonalities and 
differences between offences. Specifically, these early lectures/chapters use offence analysis 
to identify and explore the general principles of criminal law: the act requirement, the rules 
on omissions, the rules of causation, the definition of mens rea terms, and so on.  
 So far, so good. There is occasionally some dispute about whether a particular 
requirement should be classified as actus reus or mens rea (Sullivan, 1990), and this may lead 
to some uncertainties, but offence analysis generally works well in theory. Problems fully 
emerge, not in theory, but in practice. This is because, having explored the general principles 
through the mechanism of offence analysis, and having applied this to initial offences (most 
commonly murder), the mechanism is not consistently applied to other offences. Rather, with 
teaching and textbooks (understandably) mirroring the much less consistent language and 
analysis from court judgments, offence analysis is often ignored, and/or supplanted with an 
entirely new mechanism. 
 Examples of where the actus reus/mens rea distinction is ignored (at least partially), 
include core offences such as manslaughter and theft. When analysing gross negligence 
manslaughter for example, we do not identify external or mental elements, rather we focus on 
duties of care, a breach of these duties, death, and the grossness of D’s negligence. When 
analysing unlawful act manslaughter we identify an unlawful act, dangerousness, and death, 
even though these requirements involve a mix of actus reus and mens rea. Even when we 
analyse offences such as theft, where the terms actus reus and mens rea are often used, the 
five-part separation of appropriation, property, ownership, an intention to permanently 
deprive, and dishonesty, tends to dominate as our primary analytical tool. This approach to 
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theft is presented as anti-offence analysis because even quite brief reflection on the element 
of ‘dishonesty’, often presented unquestionably as a mens rea requirement, reveals a 
combination of actus reus and mens rea: D’s conduct must be dishonest by the standards of 
honest and reasonable people (external evaluation), and D must appreciate that this is the case 
(mental evaluation). Even if D believed that her conduct was dishonest, if the jury do not then 
the requirement of dishonesty will not be satisfied.     
Side-lining the use of actus reus and mens rea in relation to these offences does not 
impact the substance of the law, and it is important to remember that offence analysis is 
nothing more than an analytical tool. However, there are negative impacts for students. First, 
in the absence of a common structure to learn these offences with, the requirements are 
memorised in isolation, making them more easily confused or forgotten (Bower, 1970). And 
secondly, because the general principles are learned through offence analysis, students often 
fail to apply them to these offences, or require specific additional prompting to do so.  
 Just as problematic are the occasions where offence analysis is supplanted by an 
alternative or additional mechanism. The clearest example of this comes through the general 
inchoate offences and complicity, and the mechanism of analysis that distinguishes conduct, 
circumstances and results. The approach usually taken here has been referred to as ‘element 
analysis’ (Robinson and Grall, 1983). This approach is commonly used within the 
examination of complicity and conspiracy, and is essential for the application of attempts 
(Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s1) and inchoate assisting or encouraging (Serious Crime Act 
2007, Part 2). It is essential for these latter offences because the mens rea requirements of 
attempt and assisting or encouraging explicitly relate to the elements of the offence 
attempted, assisted or encouraged. For example, where D assists P to commit criminal 
damage, section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 requires D to believe that P will complete 
the conduct element of the criminal damage, whereas D need only be reckless as to P 
completing the other elements (Child, 2012). In this way, it is essential for students to 
understand element analysis in order to apply the assisting or encouraging offence: in our 
example, to distinguish the conduct element of criminal damage from the other elements. 
Additionally, because these inchoate offences apply generally across the criminal law (eg, 
attempted murder, attempted rape, attempted theft, etc), students must be able to re-analyse 
all the offences they have studied using element analysis where such offences are attempted 
or assisted or encouraged. Unsurprisingly, students generally struggle to meet this challenge, 
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and equally unsurprisingly, academics may be tempted to exclude such offences from the 
syllabus to avoid it.          
It should be stressed that the concerns raised in this section do not generally relate to 
the substance of the law. Despite inconsistent methods of analysis, the substantive rules 
remain the same. And in this vein, we could simply tell students to embrace the 
inconsistencies as examples of the evolving and dynamic nature of common law analysis. 
However, to do so we must also accept the highlighted difficulties that this causes students, 
and perhaps question whether we should be teaching offence analysis as our introductory 
method at all. It is my belief that we can at once present the complex inconsistencies of the 
criminal law to students, whilst also providing them with a universal tool for discussion: 
element analysis.        
 
Teaching element analysis 
The central proposal of this chapter is that we should use a single mechanism for analysis 
throughout our teaching. Element analysis is preferred because it is essential for the 
application of certain offences, and because it provides a more precise structure than offence 
analysis. This approach is adopted throughout my teaching, as well as within the textbook I 
co-author (Child and Ormerod, 2015). For ease of reference, the seven elements identified 
through the preferred method of element analysis can be presented in chart form:  
 Actus Reus Mens rea 
Conduct element 1 4 
Circumstance element 2 5 
Result element 3 6 
Ulterior mens rea element  7 
 
As the chart demonstrates, this method of element analysis still makes use of the actus 
reus/mens rea distinction, but supplements it with the further distinction of conduct, 
circumstance, and result. Take the example of criminal damage (Criminal Damage Act 1971, 
s1). The conduct element of the actus reus is the bodily movement required for the offence 
(eg, throwing a stone), the result element is the required consequence of that movement (eg, 
damaging property, such as smashing a window), and the circumstance element relates to any 
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surrounding required facts (eg, that the property (window) damaged did not belong to D). 
Each element is required for liability, in addition to their corresponding mens rea. The final 
ulterior mens rea element (element 7) is my own addition to the mechanism (Child, 2014), 
and refers to mens rea requirements that do not correspond to elements within the actus reus 
(eg, being reckless as to the endangerment of life, for aggravated criminal damage).      
 Every criminal offence can be broken down and discussed using this method of 
element analysis. Certain offences, such as aggravated criminal damage, include 
requirements within all seven elements. However, this will not always be the case: most 
offences do not include an ulterior mens rea requirement (element 7), and conduct crimes do 
not include result requirements (elements 3 and 6). Thus, the chart can be used to explore all 
offences, but this does not mean that all offences must include requirements relating to all 
elements. Where an offence is analysed which is not generally discussed using element 
analysis or even offence analysis (eg, manslaughter, theft, etc), such offences can still be 
introduced using element analysis as a point of consistency, before moving on to explain how 
the offence is alternatively discussed in the courts so that students are not confused when 
reading cases. In this way, students are provided with a universal tool for analysis, but they 
are also taught to engage with the inconsistencies of law in practice. 
 
Advantages of teaching element analysis 
There are four principal advantages to teaching element analysis as a universal tool: greater 
precision when teaching the general principles, greater consistency when teaching as a tool 
for analysis, more effective teaching as a structure to aid memory, and more manageable for 
teaching inchoate offences and complicity. Each advantage is presented in turn.  
Teaching the general principles 
When first introducing the general principles of criminal law, the precision of element 
analysis can be very useful. For example, when discussing the act requirement, this can be 
done in relation to the conduct element specifically (elements 1 and 4), avoiding the common 
student conflation of the act requirement and actus reus more generally. The requirement of 
coincidence can also be more accurately presented in relation to mens rea coinciding with the 
conduct element of an offence (element 1), as opposed to the actus reus. When discussing 
causation, this can be presented as the required nexus between the conduct and result 
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elements within the actus reus (elements 1 and 3), clearly demonstrating how it works within 
the structure of a result crime. And of particular importance, element analysis also makes it 
much easier to explain to students that the mens rea of an offence is not necessarily defined 
by a single term, but may vary between different elements (eg, intention as to the result 
element, recklessness as to the circumstance element, and so on). Indeed, the mechanism 
even facilitates the teaching of mens rea terms, allowing the lecturer to clearly present 
occasions where a particular term is only relevant to a certain element of the actus reus (eg, 
voluntariness and the conduct element), as well as where a term varies in its definition 
between elements (eg, knowledge as to circumstances or results).  
Teaching a tool for analysis 
Element analysis provides students with a toolbox to help them with their studies. Where the 
task is simple comprehension, element analysis allows students to break down a complex 
whole into more easily understood sections, essential in relation to a lot of complex modern 
statutes. The mechanism also facilitates focused analysis upon individual elements, 
highlighting uncertainties, allowing precise comparison between offences, and providing the 
language necessary for communicating this analysis to a reader. As Robinson has commented 
on codification more generally, for which he sees element analysis as a central component, 
structured analysis of legal rules will often expose problems that would otherwise be missed: 
The rambling paragraphs of case opinions and scholarly literature ... provide a permanent 
haven for the murky rule. Leaving the law’s rules to the shadows of case law and 
scholarly literature, where there is never a clear target, means less likelihood of seeing 
and correcting law’s flaws. (Robinson, 1998)     
Element analysis also provides a universal method of analysis that can be used by students 
when discussing other offences in the future. In this way, element analysis can help avoid the 
criminal law module becoming an exercise in memorising a set of offences that may change 
over time, and instead enables students to develop skills that can be (re)applied throughout 
their current and future analysis of the criminal law.     
Teaching a structure to aid memory 
Having stated that criminal law modules should avoid becoming exercises in memory 
retention, it should nevertheless be acknowledged that memorising the detail of offences can 
play a significant part in exam performance. In this regard, there is clear support within the 
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psychology literature that memories are more effectively stored and retrieved where they are 
associated with an analytical framework (Bower, 1970; Reed, 2012). Element analysis 
provides that framework. For example, rather than simply trying to remember all the various 
requirements for murder, students can work through the offence logically in their minds – are 
there any required circumstances, what mens rea is required for these; are there any required 
results, what mens rea is required for these; and so on. This process aids students when they 
are trying to remember what they have learned, as well as exposing gaps in their knowledge 
(hopefully before the exam!) that they should investigate further.    
Teaching inchoate offences and complicity 
Academic discussion of the general inchoate offences and complicity has, over time, become 
reliant on element analysis, which is needed to break down the complexity of these offences 
and describe how they work. We see this, for example, across the range of recent projects in 
this area carried out by the Law Commission of England and Wales (Law Commission, 2009, 
2007, 2006), where the Commission employ element analysis both within the discussion of 
the law as well as within their proposals for law reform. In order for students to engage with 
such material, it is important that they understand how to use element analysis.  
 Beyond this, as discussed above, the use of element analysis within offences of 
attempt and assisting or encouraging is not simply analytical. Rather, it is essential to use 
element analysis in order to apply these offences in practice: we must distinguish the 
elements of the principal offence attempted, assisted or encouraged in order to know what 
mens rea is required in relation to them. This necessity has developed through case law for 
attempt (Khan [1990] 2 All ER 783), where the courts have isolated the circumstance element 
of a principal offence for separate treatment, and through statute for assisting and 
encouraging (Serious Crime Act 2007, Part 2), where the conduct element must be 
distinguished.  
 Given the role of element analysis within these offences, the mechanism becomes 
essential for any teaching in this area. It is possible, of course, that the teaching of element 
analysis could be restricted to lectures on inchoate liability and complicity, and I believe that 
this is common practice in many institutions in England and Wales. The problem with this 
approach, however, is that the general inchoate offences and complicity apply across the 
criminal law (eg, attempted murder, assisting theft, accomplice to a sexual offence, etc). 
Therefore, isolating the teaching of element analysis to these topics effectively asks students 
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to relearn all the offences they have encountered within the criminal law course using this 
new mechanism of analysis, as well as learning how the mechanism itself works. Where 
element analysis is introduced from the beginning, and where it is used consistently within 
the analysis of each substantive offence, the challenge for students when learning the 
inchoate offences and complicity becomes considerably more manageable.        
 
Problems with teaching element analysis 
Despite the advantages of element analysis, it is important to recognise that there are several 
problems highlighted in the literature; problems that can be mitigated but not entirely 
resolved. The two major issues that I would like to discuss here are those relating to 
consistency between legal sources, and the internal coherence of element analysis.       
Problems of consistency 
Element analysis is not standardly used by courts or commentators when discussing most 
criminal offences in England and Wales. Although it is routinely used in more codified 
common law jurisdictions such as the United States and Australia (US Model Penal Code; 
Australian Criminal Code), scepticism about the usefulness of element analysis in England 
and Wales has severely limited its application. Therefore, as discussed above, it would be 
inappropriate to teach students the criminal law using element analysis alone. Rather, in order 
to maintain the benefits of internal consistency (ie, using element analysis to discuss each 
offence), whilst also enabling students to engage with the analysis of courts and academic 
commentary (ie, analysis that rarely uses element analysis), it becomes necessary to discuss 
two mechanisms of analysis when teaching each new offence (ie, element analysis and 
whatever form of analysis is most commonly employed in relation to the particular offence).  
This approach presents a number of challenges. For students, learning two 
mechanisms for each offence represents a significant increase in what they are expected to 
learn, and an increase based on form rather than substance. Thus, it is questionable whether 
spending additional time on mechanisms for analysis detracts from alternative discussions; 
discussions which could focus more directly on the substance of those offences and the 
normative questions that underpin them. Additionally, problems can emerge for students who 
confuse and conflate the different mechanisms within their analysis of offences, both in their 
learning as well as in their discussion. For academics teaching criminal law, similar problems 
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emerge in relation to additional material and time constraints, which mean that compromises 
are always necessary when considering what material to include or exclude. It can also be 
challenging, particularly across larger teaching teams, to ensure consistency between 
lecturers.    
 Although these problems of consistency are important, they should not be overstated, 
and can be minimised. First, if inchoate offences and/or complicity are taught, as surely they 
must, then teaching multiple mechanisms including element analysis is already essential: the 
question is simply where within the course this teaching should come. Secondly, even if these 
general offences are not taught, teaching multiple mechanisms can have pedagogic value. 
This value manifests in a number of ways. The main advantage of element analysis as an 
additional mechanism is that it provides a point of consistency and a detailed tool for analysis 
(points discussed above), but it also helps to demonstrate the role of such mechanisms 
(including their flexibility) as distinct from substantive legal rules. For example, where 
students have struggled with the element analysis of a particular offence, confusing or 
conflating it with other mechanisms, it is useful to remind them that (general offences aside) 
the use of multiple mechanisms is not essential in every case. Indeed, when applying or 
discussing an offence, students should be encouraged to choose whichever mechanism they 
deem most appropriate; making decisions about whether the additional detail of element 
analysis will facilitate or confuse their argument. 
Problems of coherence    
Element analysis has attracted considerable and sustained criticism for its perceived 
incoherence as a form of analysis, with commentators stressing the difficulty of objectively 
distinguishing elements. Such criticism has been discussed across the common law world, but 
have had particular impact in England and Wales (Buxton, 1984; Duff, 1996). Taking the 
offence of criminal damage for example, a lack of precise rules for distinguishing elements 
makes it difficult to say whether the result element of this offence is simply ‘damage’, with 
the issue of ‘ownership’ classified as a circumstance; whether the result element is ‘damage 
to another’s property’, with no distinct circumstance; or even whether the result could be 
‘damage to another’s property caused by D’. These confusions are particularly important 
when applying general inchoate offences that rely on such distinctions to identify mens rea, 
but they are also problematic for anyone using element analysis to discuss any aspect of an 
offence. This criticism has been central to the underuse of element analysis in England and 
10 
 
Wales generally, and remains a strong reason against its use within teaching. In short, the 
mechanism may raise more questions than it answers. 
 Several responses can, and have, been given to this line of criticism. These range from 
early denials that the problem exists (Williams, 1983), partial acceptance of the criticism 
(Law Commission, 2006, 2007), through to a more general acceptance of the criticism, 
followed by detailed re-constructions of element analysis (Child, 2014; Robinson and Grall, 
1983). However, none of the approaches have fully undermined the criticism, and certainly 
not without introducing additional complexity. 
 Such criticisms are not, however, fatal to the usefulness of element analysis. This is 
because, although any proponent of element analysis must acknowledge a degree of 
uncertainty when separating elements, the removal of such uncertainty is not essential for a 
mechanism of analysis. It is debatable whether such uncertainty alone should be sufficient to 
undermine the stricter and more substantive use of element analysis within the general 
inchoate offences and complicity (a debate for another time), but mechanisms of analysis 
generally are used to aid discussion rather than create rigid distinctions. Indeed, as was 
identified in the first section of this chapter, the more traditional mechanism of offence 
analysis also lacks complete objectivity when separating actus reus and mens rea.  
It should also be emphasised that even the debates created by current uncertainties in 
relation to element analysis are not always trivial, but have themselves often proved useful in 
unlocking areas for important normative investigation. For example, if we need to identify 
and distinguish the conduct element of an offence, then this leads us to question what we 
mean by ‘conduct’; what the role of conduct is within the construction of an offence and the 
assigning of criminal responsibility; what the role is (if any) of the act requirement within 
criminal law; and so on (Moore, 1993). Equally, where we separate the result element of 
offences as something caused by D’s conduct, then this can often lead to questions of 
responsibility and moral luck (ie, whether the law should assign additional blame where D’s 
attempted harms have come about, and corresponding leniency where they are (for whatever 
reason) thwarted (Alexander et al, 2009). In these ways, and through many other examples, 
the focus of element analysis and the distinctions it draws seem to be appropriate; and even 
where uncertainty arises, that uncertainty will often stem from and represent an important and 
interesting normative question that might otherwise have been missed.  
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Element analysis and other common law jurisdictions 
This chapter has focused on teaching criminal law in England and Wales, but much of the 
debate applies equally to other common law jurisdictions. This section provides a brief 
overview detailing the role of element analysis within selected other jurisdictions. Although 
element analysis often plays a greater (or certainly more established) role within many such 
jurisdictions, similar criticisms regularly emerge. 
 In certain jurisdictions we see the use of element analysis for analytical purposes, or 
within law reform proposals, but without its consistent application in law. This is apparent in 
Canada and Hong Kong, for example, where Law Reform Commissions have recommended 
the use of element analysis within the definition of inchoate offences and/or mens rea 
definitions, but without legislative success (Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, 1994; 
Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1987). 
 In other jurisdictions, such as Australia, New Zealand and America, the use of 
element analysis is relatively advanced. In Australia, the Model Criminal Code (MCC) uses 
element analysis to define fault terms (Div 5) and for the presumption of fault (Div 5.6), and 
the courts have employed it to define inchoate liability (Evans [1987] 48 SASR 35). In New 
Zealand, the 1989 Crimes Bill used element analysis to define inchoate liability, an approach 
later employed by the Supreme Court in L [2006] 3 NZLR 291. Perhaps the most entrenched 
use of element analysis, however, can be found in America. The US Model Penal Code uses 
element analysis to define all fault terms (§2.02), as well as within the definition of attempts 
(§5.01). This structure has been adopted in all but two of the US jurisdictions where reformed 
has occurred, and has been described as ‘the most significant and enduring achievement of 
the Code’s authors’ (Robinson and Grall, 1983).  
 Each of these jurisdictions, however, have also seen problems with element analysis, 
and explicitly questioned its usefulness. In Australia, for example, commentary to the MCC 
describes the problems of defining element analysis (Commentary s202), and despite the 
initial acceptance of the approach for inchoate liability in Evans, this case was effectively 
overruled just five years later in Knight (1992) 175 CLR 495. In New Zealand, despite 
judicial endorsement in L, a review of the Crimes Bill 1989 highlighted a number of concerns 
about the objective and coherent application of element analysis, with the Consultative 
Committee eventually recommending offence analysis alone (1991). Even in America, 
despite ‘remarkable’ acceptance of element analysis (Gainer, 1987), issues are still raised 
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about the ‘fuzziness’ of the definition of the conduct element in particular (Moore, 1993; 
Robinson and Grall, 1983). The problems here mirror those identified in the previous section 
of this chapter.     
 
Conclusion 
This chapter advocates the adoption of element analysis in the teaching of criminal law. 
Particularly when it comes to the approach that prevails in England and Wales, this amounts 
to a significant change in the way we analyse, and teach the analysis of, such law. Teaching 
element analysis as a consistent tool of analysis is challenging, both in terms of the 
mechanism’s own internal coherence, as well as the lack of similar analysis and debate (for 
many offences) within surrounding court judgments and within other academic material. 
However, the potential benefits are clear. Element analysis provides students with a tool for 
understanding, remembering, and engaging with the many and varied inconsistencies of the 
current law; with a tool for consistent and precise analysis.  
 Setting out the advantages and disadvantages of element analysis, the intention was 
not simply to say that one outweighs the other. The mechanism of element analysis outlined 
in this chapter clearly needs further work, and can be improved. However, I contend that the 
problems highlighted above (both in England and Wales, and beyond) are not terminal to the 
usefulness of element analysis, and the debates they raise have generally invigorated legal 
scholarship rather than stifling or confusing it. The idea here is to choose a mechanism that 
provides the most promise for improving student learning, and to work further on that 
mechanism to improve it, both as a general tool for analysis, and as a teaching aid.   
 One of the biggest challenges in teaching law students (and, I suspect, teaching more 
generally) is to prevent the subject becoming simply about memorising a bland set of legal 
rules, or even about memorising and repeating the analysis of others. Rather, we want law 
students to actively engage with the law and the normative questions that underpin it. It is my 
belief that the lack of consistent analysis within current legal teaching creates a barrier to this 
endeavour, creating confusion, and encouraging compartmentalism. The argument advanced 
in this chapter is that the consistent teaching of element analysis provides one means of 
breaking down that barrier.      
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